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Abstract Intellectual history still quite commonly distinguishes between the episode
weknowas the ScientificRevolution, and its successor era, theEnlightenment, in terms
of the calculatory and quantifying zeal of the former—the age of mechanics—and the
rather scientifically lackadaisical mood of the latter, more concerned with freedom,
public space and aesthetics. It is possible to challenge this distinction in a variety of
ways, but the approach I examine here, in which the focus on an emerging scientific
fieldor cluster of disciplines—the ‘life sciences’, particularly natural history,medicine,
and physiology (for ‘biology’ does not make an appearance at least under this name or
definition until the late 1790s)—is, notRomantically anti-scientific, but resolutely anti-
mathematical. Diderot bluntly states, in his Thoughts on the interpretation of nature
(1753), that “We are on the verge of a great revolution in the sciences. Given the taste
people seem to have for morals, belles-lettres, the history of nature and experimental
physics, I dare say that before a hundred years, there will not be more than three great
geometricians remaining in Europe. The science will stop short where the Bernoullis,
the Eulers, the Maupertuis, the Clairauts, the Fontaines and the D’Alemberts will
have left it…. We will not go beyond.” Similarly, Buffon in the first discourse of
his Histoire naturelle (1749) speaks of the “over-reliance on mathematical sciences,”
given that mathematical truths are merely “definitional” and “demonstrative,” and
thereby “abstract, intellectual and arbitrary.” Earlier in the Thoughts, Diderot judges
“the thing of the mathematician” to have “as little existence in nature as that of the
gambler.” Significantly, this attitude—taken by great scientists who also translated
Newton (Buffon) or wrote careful papers on probability theory (Diderot), as well as
by others such as Mandeville—participates in the effort to conceptualize what we
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might call a new ontology for the emerging life sciences, very different from both
the ‘iatromechanism’ and the ‘animism’ of earlier generations, which either failed to
account for specifically living, goal-directed features of organisms, or accounted for
them in supernaturalistic terms by appealing to an ‘anima’ as explanatory principle.
Anti-mathematicism here is then a key component of a naturalistic, open-ended project
to give a successful reductionist model of explanation in ‘natural history’ (one is
tempted to say ‘biology’), a model which is no more vitalist than it is materialist—but
which is fairly far removed from early modern mechanism.
Keywords Anti-mathematicism · Materialism · Vitalism · Medicine
Le règne des mathématiques n’est plus. Le goût a changé. C’est celui de l’histoire
naturelle et des lettres qui domine.
Diderot to Voltaire, 19 February 1758
1 Introduction
Intellectual history still quite commonly distinguishes between the episode we know
as the Scientific Revolution, and its successor era, the Enlightenment, in terms of the
calculatory and quantifying zeal of the former—the age of mechanics—and the rather
scientifically lackadaisical mood of the latter, more concerned with freedom, public
space and aesthetics. Thus the eminent specialist of early modern medicine, Mirko
Grmek, describes the eighteenth century, as regards life sciences and technology, as
“a kind of bridge thrown from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century…. The eigh-
teenth century is far less original than the seventeenth. The Enlightenment develops the
research programs invented by the Scientific Revolution” (Grmek 1980, pp. 323–324).
More socio-politically driven studies of the Enlightenment portray it in terms equally
far removed from the present study, as possessed of a rage de calcul, a calculating
frenzy associated with figures such as Condorcet: a will to map out society and the
natural world, that is, to quantify and control them, as it develops the weights and
measures of the metric system (Mayr 1986, pp. 66, 42–54, 124).1 Conversely, some
prominent historians of Enlightenment medicine wish to emphasize that constella-
tions such as Enlightenment vitalism are far removed from the “merely mechanical”
Scientific Revolution, with its overtones of alienation from Nature (Williams 2003).
The present discussion of eighteenth-century ‘anti-mathematicism’ in the context
of programmatic and methodological discussions in the life sciences does not operate
according to such distinctions. Rather, it seeks to turn our attention towards, not a
school of thought or an individual figure, but a trend that emerges in the shift of focus
towards the life sciences, i.e., in the various efforts to conceptualize an emerging
1 Mayr seems to be recycling an old intuition of Foucault’s, according to which the eighteenth century
was essentially concerned with discipline, automatization and social control, in an obsessive extension of
a mathesis universalis, with La Mettrie’s ‘man-machines’ serving as an image of infinitely reproducible
automata under the orders of Frederick the Great (Foucault 1975, p. 138). Minsoo Kang endorses Foucault’s
view in his otherwise superlative study of automata across the centuries, which I learned a great deal from
(Kang 2011, p. 133f.). For an overview of the theme of automatization in the Enlightenment, see Schaffer
(1999).
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scientific field or cluster of disciplines—the ‘life sciences’, particularly natural history,
medicine, and physiology (for ‘biology’ does not make an appearance at least under
this name or definition until the late 1790s, even if recent scholarship is pushing back
this recorded usage by a few decades2). A comparable analysis was suggested, with
an earlier historical case study, by Claire Salomon-Bayet. Studying the anatomical
reports at the Académie des Sciences in the first decades of its existence, after its
foundation in 1666, she showed that despite the Académie being set up on Cartesian,
mechanistic bases, as it focused on cases drawn from the ‘biomedical’ world (anatomy,
embryology, vital chemistry and so on) it quickly contradicted this research program
(Salomon-Bayet 1978). In my case, I specifically examine anti-mathematicism as a
defining feature of some central, programmatic Enlightenment statements of the status
of the life sciences, andwill suggest that it appears in different versions, some stronger,
some weaker. I will broadly characterize these different types of anti-mathematicism
as either more skeptical or more ontologically based.
What interests me in this attitude—taken by great scientists who also translated
Newton (Buffon) or wrote careful papers on probability theory (Diderot), as well as
by others such as Mandeville—is that it participates in the effort to conceptualize
what I shall call a new ontology for the (newly emerging) life sciences, very differ-
ent from both the ‘iatromechanism’ and the ‘animism’ of earlier generations, which
respectively failed to account for specifically living, goal-directed features of organ-
isms, or accounted for them in supernaturalistic terms by appealing to an ‘anima’ as
explanatory principle.3 Anti-mathematicism is also not Romantically anti-scientific.4
I suggest it was part of a more naturalistic, open-ended project to give a successful
reductionist model of explanation in ‘natural history’ (one is tempted to say ‘biology’),
in the sense of an explanation which takes a higher-level phenomenon, say, voluntary
action, or the association of ideas, and explains it in terms of lower-level processes,
whether these be physiological (as in La Mettrie) or psychologically deterministic (as
in Diderot). Such models attend to the specificities of vital processes without being
thereby ‘vitalistic’, and they often, but not always, are associated with more or less
overt materialist implications in the texts discussed here, while also seeking to create
a distance from early modern mechanism.
Programmatic ideas for how to conceptualise the life sciences—their scope, their
method, and their boundaries—in the mid- to late-eighteenth century often appealed
to Newtonian insights. From the celebrated physiologist Albrecht von Haller to the
2 McLaughlin (2002); see in addition Bognon-Küss and Wolfe (Eds.), forthcoming. I have made the pre-
liminary case elsewhere for why a considerable part of the (broad) domain of ‘natural history’ as used by
authors such asDiderot andBuffon corresponds towhat wewould call ‘biology’: not just a ‘geological’-type
history of Life but also a comprehensive, comparative study (Wolfe 2009).
3 On iatromechanism see Grmek (1972); on Stahlian animism see Duchesneau (2000). The idea of a
‘neither-nor’ position will also be familiar to those who have studied eighteenth-century medical vitalism,
which is not the topic of the present article, although I touch on authors like Bordeu and Venel who belong
to that story.
4 Of course there were traditions of ‘Romantic science’ (as discussed in Cunningham and Jardine (Eds.),
1990; Poggi andBossi (Eds.). 1994), but the strands of anti-mathematicism I describe herewere not attempts
at erecting ‘parallel’ or ‘rival’ scientific programs; in addition, an author like Diderot is a committed
determinist, quite willing to allow for natural ‘modelling’ of human behavior, including in the sense of
social regularities.
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group of physicians known as the Montpellier vitalists, this kind of approach sought
to capitalize on the power of the Newtonian analogy—i.e., the claim that postulating
an unknown in order to deduce regularities from it, as Newton did with gravity, can
also be a fruitful approach in the study of specifically vital properties, postulating a
‘vital principle’ or ‘vital force’—without any metaphysical or experimental claim to
be doing a ‘different kind of science’. But some other approaches, which also had
a strong affinity to vitalism, albeit in the form of a ‘vital materialism’ (Reill 2005;
Wolfe, 2017), were more opposed to physico-mathematical encroachment onto the
territory of the life sciences, while nevertheless not being ‘anti-science’.
2 Anti-mathematics and quantification
One form of anti-mathematicism in life science was the physician Bernard Mandev-
ille’s skeptical attitude, in his Treatise of Hypochondriack and Hysterical Diseases
(1711, revised 1730) towards quantitative, numerical approaches in medicine, itself
reminiscent of Thomas Sydenham’s hostility tomechanism-friendly anatomical exper-
imentation. Where Mandeville stated that “Our shallow Understandings will never
penetrate into the Structure of Parts of that amazing as well as mysterious Composi-
tion, theMass of Blood” (p. 168), Sydenham, in a 1668 manuscript entitled Anatomia,
which may well have been written with Locke (indeed, current scholarship tends to
attribute its authorship primarily to Locke), is explicitly hostile to the value or success
of quantitative experiments and intervention in medicine: “it is …beyond controversy
that nature perform all her operations in the body by parts so minute and insensible
that I think noe body will ever hope or pretend even by the assistance of glasses or
any other invention to come to a sight of them.”5 In his Treatise, which is in dialogue
form, Mandeville addresses the issue in a more diverse fashion, including by bringing
in an analysis of social trends in medicine, such as mathematization. The upshot is
a rather skeptical discussion of a newer version of the phenomenon, Newtonianism
in medicine (Mandeville 1730, pp. 175, 201). The character Philopirio, who various
hints identify as Mandeville,6 specifies that it is in the realm of practice that he cannot
see the usefulness of mathematics. The other character, Misomedon notes that it may
be a matter of time:
But the Scheme of bringing Mathematicks into the Art of Medicine is not of
many Years standing yet. The Newtonian Philosophy, which I believe has in a
great measure been the Occasion of the Attempt, was not made publick before
the latter End of the last Century: And considering the vast Extent the Art of
Physick is of, both as to Diseases incident to human Bodies, and the Medicines
that are made use of, great length of time must be required before an entire
5 Sydenham/Locke, Anatomia (1668), Locke ms., National Archives PRO 30/24/72/2 ff. 36v–37r., tran-
scribed in Dewhurst (1963), pp. 85–93, here, p. 85. The manuscript is attributed variously to each or both
authors, different parts being in the handwriting of one or the other.
6 Philopirio clearly seems to be a kind of avatar of Mandeville—a foreign-trained physician with radical
materialist leanings when he waxes theoretical or metaphysical (stated first in the Preface (Mandeville 1730,
p. xiii) and more explicitly with reference to the ‘Low Countries’ (3)). Later in the book (p. 126) Philopirio
notes he studied in Leyden (like Mandeville, who had defended a thesis on animal automatism at Leyden
in 1689), and adds (p. 132) that he defended a thesis “Chylosi vitiata” in 1691.
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System can be form’d, that shall be applicable to all Cases, and by the Help of
which; Men shall be able to explain all Phenomena that may occur, and solve
all the Difficulties and Objections that may be made (Mandeville 1730, p. 181).
Obviously, in themechanical approach to the structure of the body, we needmathemat-
ics, Philopirio grants: “All Fluids likewise are subject to the laws of Hydrostaticks”
(p. 179). But if we do not know the exact nature of the elements of these entities,
calculations are pointless (p. 183). What physicians want to know and they lack is
(a) the causes of diseases and (b) the properties (“virtues”) of each remedy in the
materia medica (ibid.). An exact mathematico-mechanical model in which the dose
of the remedy is proportionate to the quantity of blood in the individual is false, since
temperaments or individual natures as encountered by the physician do not obey such
laws (p. 187). Mandeville had already expressed some irony with regards to this quan-
titative confidence earlier, recalling his skepticism towards the promise of a kind of
transparency in knowledge (like Sydenham’s): “I know it is a received opinion now-
a-days, that a Man of Sense who understands Anatomy, and something of Mechanick
Rules, ought to penetrate into the Manner of every Operation that is performed in a
Human Body, it being but a mere Machine” (p. 115).
The latter opinion was a core claim of the Scottish iatromechanist (and medical
Newtonian) William Cockburn, some decades earlier: “The doses of medicaments
necessary to elicit a certain effect are proportional to the quantity of the blood” in the
individual:
for if a particular dose were required to alter the thickness of, say, one pound of
blood to a particular degree, then twice the dose would be necessary in order to
alter two pounds to the same degree, thrice to three, etc. And generally, if the
quantity of blood b requires dose d, then the quantity of blood mb requires the
dose md. (Cockburn and Southwell 1704, pp. 2119–2220)
Perhaps the most radical statement of this pro-mathematical view in its Scottish
‘medical Newtonian’ version was that of the Edinburgh physician Archibald Pitcairne.
In his 1692 Inaugural Lecture at Leyden, entitled “An Oration Proving the Profession
of Physic Free from the Tyranny of any Sect of Philosophers,” Pitcairne emphasized
the priority of mathematics over philosophy for physicians (Pitcairne 1715, p. 8), and
in his Elementa Medicinae of 1717 wrote that “All Diseases of the Fluids consist either
in a Change of their Qualities, or a Change of the Velocities of their Motions”; hence
“The cure of every Disease, whether in the Vessels or Fluids, or both, is to be effected
only by mechanical Laws.”7
Such views concerning, not just the pertinence of mathematics in medicine but its
absolute applicability, continued to be held in the Enlightenment by figures such as
George Cheyne, focusing notably on a quantitative approach to fevers and to diet,
although with a more heuristic usage of mathematics than in earlier ‘static medicine’
7 Elementa Medicinae (1717), translated as The Philosophical and Mathematical Elements of Physick
(1718), §§ LXXVII and LXXXVIII, in Pitcairne (1718), pp. 353, 354. That Pitcairne’s arguments in favour
of mathematics, contra philosophy may have a political subtext (promoting the ‘certainty’ of mathematics
against the danger of dissent, enthusiasm and theological ferment, as discussed in Schaffer 1989) lies beyond
the scope of the present paper.
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(medicina statica). The latter program, associated notably with Sanctorius (who was
William Harvey’s professor at Padua) sought to measure bodily ingesta and excreta,
including blood, sweat, urine and tears, and formulate ratios of these measures in
order to further enhance the medical goal of preserving health (Dacome 2012). Thus,
for instance, Pitcairne summarized Sanctorius as presenting proportions such as “the
Excretions made in a given Time have commonly this Proportion, that if the Excretion
by Stool be as 4, That by Urine is as 16, and That thro’ the Pores of the Skin as 40, or
more” (cit. in Stigler 1992, p. 110).8
It is worth stressing the literally quantitative character of the claims of the Scottish
iatromathematicians, because such claims are often erroneously assimilated to the ear-
lier, enormously influential proofs for the circulation of the blood in William Harvey.
The latter proofs are often treated as quantitative—one author wrote rather anachro-
nistically that “Harvey was the first biologist to use quantitative proofs”,9 but this is
a real misunderstanding. In Chapters X and XI of De Motu Cordis Harvey used the
language of “experimental evidence” (“the first proposition (of circulation) has been
proved…by reference to experimental evidence…,” Harvey 1628/1976, Chapter X, p.
85) but overwhelmingly cashed this out in qualitative terms, and the ‘paradigmatic’
ligature experiment in Chapter XI is full of appeals to our ability to “feel” changes in
the blood, as is also the case in the later De Generatione Animalium, where primarily
qualitative observations predominate, and are presented as experiments by him (e.g.
chapter XVII, in Harvey 1651/1981, p. 99).10
AsPeterDistelzweig has observed,Harvey’s proofs, howevermuch theymayappeal
rhetorically to simple arithmetic, and granting that they do deal with the quantity of
blood produced in the body, are not at the service of a larger mathematical articula-
tion of significant relations among quantifiable aspects of nature; nor are these proofs
taken, the way they might be in, say, Galileo, as the basis of a quantitative “method.”11
Exactly what should count as quantification, quantitative proofs, quantitative explana-
tions, etc., is not immediately apparent: “not giving specific quantities…is not the same
as being content with rough values because they are adequate to prove the point.”12
Some prominent figures who were seen as champions of mechanical medicine (and
8 The prominent iatromechanical physician Giorgio Baglivi insisted in the early 1700s that static medicine
be considered a legitimate part of the medicine of solids, and recommended to this end the reading of
both Harvey and Sanctorius (Dacome 2012, p. 385), a connection reiterated in the scholarly literature,
e.g. “Harvey was to some extent applying the mental habits of the dietetic physician” (Bylebyl 1977, p.
383). Similar considerations were involved, not in the study of digestion but of circulation (before and after
Harvey), for instance with regard to how much blood it was suitable to eliminate in bloodletting.
9 Kilgour, cit. in Massey (1995), p. 20. See also Pagel (1976), pp. 3–5.
10 See Salter andWolfe (2009) for more discussion of this point. Massey (1995) critically evaluates various
charges against Harvey’s experiments for not being ‘quantitative enough’ (pp. 43–45), in a way which
complements my ‘qualitative’ point here (and what is termed “embodied empiricism” in Salter and Wolfe
(2009)). The same point can be made by focusing on the term (and the notion) of a law (thinking of e.g.
Galilean laws, like the law of falling bodies): Harvey doesn’t speak about his account of circulation as a
law, while the Scottish Newtonians in the 1690s and thereafter explicitly use the language of laws.
11 See Massey (1995), Distelzweig (2016) for detailed discussion of Harvey’s method as quantitative or
not, mathematical or not, mechanistic or not. Thanks to Peter Distelzweig for helpful discussion of these
matters.
12 Jevons, cit. in Massey (1995), p. 41; see also Porter (2000).
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by later philosophers of science, as formulators of beautiful quantitative proofs) such
as Harvey, actually seem to attend more to qualitative differences, e.g. between blood
being newly generated and blood in a circular circuit (correlated, e.g. with the food we
ingest), especially if compared to more zealous quantifiers such as the ‘medical New-
tonians’, particularly Pitcairne. Similarly, the different forms of anti-mathematicism
I discuss here have no strict (at least other than contextual and situated13) definition
of quantification. But what did the skeptical responses amount to, other than being
sarcastic about claims that the body was a “mere Machine”?
3 Skeptical anti-mathematicism
Objections very similar toMandeville’s but now emanating from a vitalist contextwere
made by Jean Charles Marguerite Guillaume de Grimaud, a late figure of Montpel-
lier vitalism whose medical thesis on irritability was published only under his initials
(‘D.G.’) in 1776. Grimaud explicitly targeted Keill and others on their claims to quan-
tifymuscular action, specifically contractility, combiningmathematical criticismswith
appeals to empirical evidence, ranging from the bizarre feats of muscular strength in
the animal world to King Augustus II of Poland’s ability to bend horseshoes with two
fingers, and the better-known case of the polyp (Grimaud 1776, pp. 33, 35). Some like
Keill or Boerhaave ended up under-estimating muscular capacity; others like Borelli,
due to their belief that the internal structure of muscular tissue was rhomboids, ended
up overshooting the figure by 60 times (p. 37).
Again likeMandeville, the prominentMontpellier vitalist Théophile de Bordeuwas
suspicious with regard to quantification, but in his case took the example of sphyg-
mology, i.e. the medicine of the pulse, and discussed attempts to measure the pulse
using a watch or a metronome; for Bordeu, in this influenced by Japanese and Chinese
medicine via Jesuit translations, a pulse was either fast or slow, soft or hard, etc.14
Bordeu also has combined criticisms of chemists, mathematicians and mechanists that
seem to imply a stronger ontological commitment to the nature of Life as something
specific with regard to physico-mechanical Nature: the mechanist, but also the “most
sublime mathematician” cannot grasp the depths of nature; just as the chemist cannot
literally make blood, the physician “cannot make a machine like the heart, the brain
or the stomach” (p. 831). Bordeu opposes this sense of life to the most sublime ideas
of mathematicians, physicists, and other sorts of natural philosophers (the term itself
was not used in French).15 These criticisms are similar in kind to earlier medical crit-
13 Cf. Roux’s “historically situated and empirical definition of mathematics”: “what should be called
‘mathematics’ is the activities of those who called themselves or were called by others ‘mathematicians”’
(Roux 2010, p. 325).
14 Bordeu,Recherches sur le pouls par rapport aux crises (1754), in Bordeu (1818), vol. I, pp. 257–258 (All
translations are mine unless otherwise indicated); see also Terada (2006). Bordeu’s discussion of the history
of medical theories of the pulse is actually more complicated than this, as he criticizes both Galenic and
more ancient (e.g. Chinese) theories for their vagueness, and proposes what wemight call more “functional”
descriptions, referring to the activity of other organ systems such as the arteries, but also to rhythm and
pace.
15 Bordeu, Recherches sur les maladies chroniques (1775), § XVI, in Bordeu (1818), vol. II, pp. 831–832.
However, there is no monolithic anti-mathematical position in the Montpellier vitalist context. The Stahlian
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icisms of the (medical) pertinence of weighing a patient’s urine, and more generally
to criticisms of the ‘anthropometric’ tradition of medicina statica that were made e.g.
in reaction to Sanctorius’ program to quantify all bodily intakes and outtakes.
In his Treatise, Mandeville had given the example of water: the difference between
cold water, which we drink with pleasure and is necessary to our survival, and hot
water, whichmakes us vomit, is not a difference that can bemeasured in itsmass (Man-
deville 1730, pp. 192–194). Vomiting, purgatives and emetics had obviously posed a
challenge to both dogmatic mechanists (‘triturationists’ with regard to digestion) and
strict iatrochemists, since the processes involved could not be properly accounted
for by reductive explanations of either kind; this led authors such as Leibniz, a few
decades earlier, to devise hybrid, mechanico-chemical explanations for such phenom-
ena (Smith 2011, Chapter 1). If he was not (quite) a mechanist, how does Mandeville
account for the physiological processes which apparently underly our corporeal and
mental life? In chemical terms, appealing to “ferment” concepts in medicine (p. 17),
naming “Concoction” as “that which is the basis of the whole Oeconomy” (p. 84).
In the iatrochemical tradition of authors such as Thomas Willis, fermentation was
a fundamental explanatory tenet, enabling the physician to account for a variety of
phenomena, from digestion to fevers to disease overall, in terms of different chemical
mixtures and their degrees of ‘fermentation’. Of course there is no absolute historical
or conceptual opposition between Newtonianism and chemistry: Herman Boerhaave,
the author of the Elementa Chemiae (1732), would certainly not have approved of
opposing them. But thinkers such as Mandeville and Diderot did so, the first on practi-
cal, falsifiable grounds, and the second for reasons involvingmatter theory and broader
ontological commitments. And this difference between two anti-mathematical posi-
tions fits with the broader diversity of pro-mathematical projects for transferring, say,
Newtonian methodology to the social sciences, without any particular foundationalist
ontological claims.16
Again, Mandeville was skeptical but allowed that medicine might be mathematized
in time. Albrecht von Haller—no opponent of geometrization (he stated in the famous
first sentence of his influential textbook in physiology, the 1757Elementa physiologiæ,
Footnote 15 continued
Boissier de Sauvages, a professor in Montpellier during the study years of figures such as Bordeu and
Venel, was explicitly dismissive of anti-mathematical trends, bluntly asserting that “I attribute the errors
committed inMedicine to a lack of knowledge ofMathematics,” describing mathematics as the “foundation
of physics and philosophy,” and warning against those who seek to “banish it from medical schools” (de
Sauvages 1772, vol. I, p. 77). Sauvages acknowledges that some parts of mathematics, like “astronomy
and trigonometry,” are not useful to medicine, but contrasts these with fluid dynamics (for understanding
blood vessels), acoustics and optics (for understanding hearing and vision) (pp. 77–78). Similarly, Robert
Whytt, a member of the same medical tradition (animism) in the Scottish context, also privileges the soul
as an explanatory term while at the same time conducting extensive quantitative experiments in life science,
notably repeating the ‘hydrostatic’ experiments of Stephen Hales, and using quantitative arguments to
address cases like the treatment of gallstones (Whytt 1755).
16 Thanks to Sebastián Molina for this point. One could add that the distinction between ontologically
founded and strictly skeptical forms of anti-mathematicism matches the diversity of iatromathematical
projects, some which genuinely seek to reduce bodily organs to mathematical entities (an ‘ontological’
reduction, then), others which view mathematization as a kind of heuristics.
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that “the fibre is to the physiologist what the line is to the geometrician”17)—stakes out
a kind of middle ground, first granting mathematics a place: “I shall not insist on the
usefulness of mathematics in the animal economy. It is evident in the functions of the
eye, but is not with regard to the movements of the vital organs,” but conceding that it
has not yet arrived at a satisfactory level of development: “Up until now, the calculators
have arrived at such opposed results that they have put off modern physiologists from
any use of geometry” (von Haller 1777, XXIII, p. 428b).
It is not just a matter of being pro- or anti-mathematical; further sub-categories are
needed here, becauseMandeville, Haller, and others all concur on a ‘relative place’ for
mathematics in life science (potentially a great place, in Haller), yet they differ from
each other. We should distinguish between stronger and weaker skeptical attitudes
towards mathematics in life science (medicine and physiology in particular), repre-
sented here by Mandeville and Haller respectively: Mandeville’s stronger skepticism,
with its Molière-like demystification of the pretentions of the learned physicians, is
quite different from Haller’s weaker skepticism, which amounts to the confidence
that medicine and physiology may achieve mathematical rigor (and quantification)
in time. And somewhere in between—less skeptical of medical confidence in gen-
eral than Mandeville but also less confident of a gradual, cumulative improvement
of mathematical tools in medicine than Haller—lies the position succinctly put in a
1695 polemic against Pitcairne as “It is not the Use, but the Abuse of [Mathematics]
I complain of.”18 Now, more mathematically oriented readers might ask at this point,
but which mathematics is at issue? which branch of mathematics, at which stage of
historical evolution? But my analysis is concerned with anti-mathematical arguments,
which I classify according to different forms, indeed ‘strengths’ of anti-mathematical
attitudes. And these arguments seem to use ‘mathematics’, the idea of quantification,
abstraction, formalization and such more or less as overlapping terms, running them
into one another if not treating them as synonyms per se.
Consider the criticism made by a noted mathematician, D’Alembert, of the appli-
cation of calculations to “the art of healing,” in a rather visible place, the “Discours
Préliminaire” of the Encyclopédie. D’Alembert warns that we should take mathemat-
ical hypotheses in medicine with quite a grain of salt:
Yet we must admit that the Geometricians sometimes abuse this application of
Algebra to Physics. Lacking experiments on which to found their calculations,
they really allow themselves the most convenient (commodes) hypotheses they
can, which often are quite far from what really exists in Nature. People have
sought to reduce even the art of healing to calculation; and the human body, this
very complex machine, has been treated by our algebraic Physicians as if it were
the simplest (and easiest to decompose) machine.19
Similarly, the deliberately ambiguous comment in the article “Méchanicien (Méde-
cine),” also in the Encyclopédie, combines an empirical observation (“Of all the
17 Fibra enim physiologo id est, quod linea geometræ (von Haller 1757, I, p. 2).
18 Edward Eizat, Apollo Mathematicus: or the Art of Curing Diseases by the Mathematicks, 1695, cit.
Stigler (1992), p. 114.
19 Enc. I, p. vi, emphasis mine (thanks to Iulia Mihai for calling my attention to this passage).
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physical sciences to which we have attempted to apply Geometry, it appears that there
is none in which it penetrates less than Medicine”) with a more slippery distinction
between an illegitimate ‘geometrization’ of medicine and a legitimate ‘geometrical
inspiration’ in the same science (“With the support of Geometry, physicians will
undoubtedly be better physicists, that is, the esprit géométrique they take from Geom-
etry, will be of greater use to them than Geometry”) (Anon 1765, p. 221).
All these objections to iatromechanics in its particularly mathematical form are
fundamentally empirical. With the exception of some of the vitalist authors, who
we will encounter again below, the objections do not rest on an ontology of Life
or, differently put, they do not ontologize the features of either mathematical entities
(negatively) or organic, biomedical entities (positively). At most, Mandeville seems to
be skeptical of quantification inasmuch as it purports to deliver universal explanations;
he stresses particulars, such as particular temperaments.
4 Ontological anti-mathematicism
In contrast to all of the above, Diderot offered a much sharper, and perhaps more
‘categorical’ form of Mandeville’s objection. Where Mandeville was skeptical about
mechanicalmethods but allowed for their content to be gradually filled in by successful
experiments (like Haller), and D’Alembert was concerned about applicability, Diderot
hinted at a profound ontological divide between the two kinds of sciences, in this
passage from his Pensées sur l’interprétation de la nature (1753–1754):
We are on the verge of a great revolution in the sciences. Given the taste people
seem to have for morals, belles-lettres, the history of nature and experimental
physics, I dare say that before a hundred years, there will not be more than three
great geometricians remaining in Europe. The science will stop short where
the Bernoullis, the Eulers, the Maupertuis, the Clairauts, the Fontaines and the
D’Alemberts will have left it. …We will not go beyond.20
Diderot uses ‘geometricians’, as he often does, as a generic term for mathematicians.
(E.g., in a text that occurs in different versions in several of his writings, in which
Diderot describes an absent-minded “geometrician” lost in thought and behaving in
an automatic, indeed deterministic fashion, the geometrician is clearly D’Alembert.21
It is also obvious that his objections elsewhere, centring on abstraction, have little to
do with the specifics of geometry understood as a technique of spatial visualization.)
His crucial claim, whether or not it was historically validated, is that mathematics will
just drop off or stay where it is, whereas the ‘life sciences’ will take off (the “history of
nature” or “natural history” was a term designating the cluster of activities we might
today call biology: Hoquet 2010; Wolfe 2009, 2014).22 Diderot meant this both as a
20 Diderot, Pensées sur l’interprétation de la nature § IV, in Diderot (1975), IX, pp. 30–31. I discuss this
at greater length in Wolfe (2014), with regard to Diderot’s labelling of an epigenetic materialism as a kind
of ‘modern Spinozism’.
21 Éléments de physiologie, ch. VI, “Volonté,“ in Diderot (1975), XVII, p. 485.
22 It is indeed the case that the program of natural history had something to do with a rejection of Carte-
sianism, definitely with an anti-mathematical attitude. Similarly, it is possible, or even probable, that a
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fact about scientific activity and as an ontological claim, that the processes and entities
life scientists seek to understand are not to be understood in mathematical terms, as
he explained in the same text:
One of the truths that has recently been announced with great courage and force,
which a good physicist should not lose sight of, and which will have the most
beneficial consequences, is that the realm of themathematicians is an intellectual
one, what we take to be rigorous truths absolutely loses this advantage when it
is brought down to our earth. It was concluded that experimental philosophy
had to rectify the calculations of the geometricians – a consequence even the
geometricians granted. But what’s the point of correcting geometric calculations
by experience? Isn’t it more direct to rely on the latter’s results? This shows
that mathematics, especially of the transcendent sort, leads to nothing particular
without experience; it is a kind of general metaphysics which strips bodies of
their individual properties…(§ II, emphasis mine).
The issue is not just an ‘externalist’ one of which sciences rise and which sciences fall,
as seen from a kind of sociological standpoint, but also that of a metaphysics which
fails to do justice to the properties of (individual) bodies.
A major influence on Diderot’s ideas here was the work of the great naturalist
Buffon, whose Histoire naturelle had begun to appear in (1749), thus just a few years
before Diderot’s Interprétation. There, Buffon had spoken of an “overreliance (abus)
on mathematical sciences,” given that mathematical truths are merely “definitional
truths”: “exact and demonstrative” but also “abstract, intellectual and arbitrary.”23
Buffon was a mathematician and translator of Newton (Méthode des fluxions, 1740),
just as Diderot published works on probability theory and attempted an analysis of
Newton in his Mémoires sur différents sujets de mathématiques.24 Here, however,
Buffon is less of a Newtonian, for he is seeking to define and delimit the realms of
“natural history and particular physics” (physique particulière), as non-mathematical.
In natural history, Buffon declared, “the topics are too complicated for calculations
and measures to be advantageously applied.”25 Indeed, Diderot’s bold claim about
a “revolution in the sciences” follows shortly after a passage referring to Buffon’s
criticismof abstraction.26 Buffon’s critiqueofmathematical truth opposes it tophysical
Footnote 22 continued
different intellectual strand, more Baconian, more Lockean, leads through natural history to ‘biology’. Yet
Bacon would not have approved of the anti-mathematical impulse in Diderot and Buffon (see Bacon, De
Augmentis Scientarum, III, 6, in Bacon 1857, p. 578; Vartanian 1992, p. 130).
23 Buffon, “De la manière d’étudier l’Histoire Naturelle,” in Buffon (1749), I, “Premier discours,” p. 54.
24 On Diderot’s mathematical ability (his capacity to follow differential calculus but not the work of Euler
or D’Alembert, and his work in probability theory), see Dhombres (1985).
25 Buffon, “De la manière,” in Buffon (1749), I, p. 62; Hoquet (2005), p. 175; Hoquet (2010), p. 38 (which
emphasizes the difference between a mathematical project and a ‘physical’ project in Buffon, where the
latter is a kind of natural history, but conceived of as a quasi-physics).
26 Eric Schliesser has pointed out that this resembles Hume, Treatise I.iv.1; the question of Diderot’s debt to
Hume is not easy to make out, although for a convincing textual confrontation between Hume’s Dialogues
and Diderot’s Letter on the Blind that reveals surprising resonances and perhaps chains of influence, see
Paganini (ms. 2015).
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truth, a distinction specific to him (mathematical truths are abstract and definitional;
physical truths are “non-arbitrary,” “do not depend on us,” and “are based on facts”27)
but which is comparable to Diderot’s remarks in the Pensées sur l’interprétation de
la nature and the Principes philosophiques sur la matière et le mouvement (where he
asserts “I, who am a physicist and a chemist, who take bodies in nature and not in
my mind,” Diderot 1975, XVII, p. 34), as I discuss in Sect. 4. Buffon’s work is not
always easy to classify, and it is peppered with conceptual personifications such as the
moule intérieur, about which no scholarly consensus has emerged over the past few
generations of excellent Buffonian work. But it seems safe to say that he valued many
kinds of mathematics while being suspicious at least of their current applicability to
the sciences of living nature. As I will discuss in closing, Diderot ‘ontologized’ and
generalized this kind of suspicion.
Nicolas Fréret, the Secretary of the Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres in
Paris, close to the encyclopédistes, and overall a fascinating figure at the intersection
of historical erudition and underground intellectual activity, often described as one of
the major atheist writers of the first half of the eighteenth century in France, made a
very similar criticism of the dangers of mathematical abstraction, with an additional
reference to atomism as the original version of the problem, for its mistaken belief
that one could treat the size, shape or motion of atoms as separate properties. In his
influential clandestinework, theLettre de Thrasybule à Leucippe (written in the 1720s-
1730s, in circulation from 1745 onwards, although only formally published in 1768),
he wrote that
In mathematics, for instance, geometricians, whose object [of study] is the mag-
nitude or quantity of bodies, have grown accustomed to examine the following:
points, i.e. extensions without length, width or depth; lines, i.e. extensions with
length alone; surfaces, which possess length and width but no depth; and lastly,
solids, i.e. bodies which possess these three dimensions. They are the first to
grant that no body does or can exist, in the way they imagine their points, lines
and surfaces; that these mathematical bodies only exist in our mind, whereas all
natural bodies are genuinely extended in all directions.28
These criticisms are very close to Diderot’s comment, also in the Pensées (shortly
before the passage quoted above), in which he judges “the thing of the mathematician”
to have “as little existence in nature as that of the gambler.”29 Of course, this was not
intended as a derogatory comment, as Diderot was discussing the mathematics of
games, but he does emphasize that the existence of mathematical entities, like that of
the entities in games, is purely conventional.
27 Buffon (1749), I, pp. 54–55.
28 Fréret (1745/1986), ch. VII, pp. 339–340, 370–371. Fréret continues with a less frontal critique of
arguments for the divisibility of matter. In his 1751 report on the Abbé du Resnel’s mémoire on the utility
of mathematics versus that of belles-lettres, Fréret enumerates many positive traits of mathematics both
internally and for its concrete accomplishments, but notes (Fréret 1751, p. 24) that the “esprit de calcul”
can indeed be extended beyond its legitimate realms of applicability, with results that then turn negative.
29 Diderot, Pensées sur l’interprétation de la nature, § III, in Diderot (1975), IX, p. 30.
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In addition to these critiques of mathematical abstraction, which as we can see,
were part of a certain kind of radical intellectual subculture of the time, Diderot makes
two major points in the passage on ‘revolution in the sciences’ cited above. The first is
a claim about the revolutionary dimension of the life sciences in contrast to the ‘static’
situation of the mathematical sciences. This claim is both a ‘sociological’ observation
and prediction concerning the objects of scientific interest, and amore normative asser-
tion that a certain kind of entity—living beings—will require a certain kind of science,
with methods and implicitly an ontology different from those of previously existing
sciences such as geometry and mechanics (Wolfe 2011). The second claim hints at a
critique of mathematical abstraction. Importantly, both have a twofold dimension, in
that they are both empirical claims and amount to an ontological commitment to a
materialist metaphysics of Life.30
5 Chemical anti-mathematicism
Diderot reiterates his critique of mathematical abstraction a number of years later, in a
short piece of natural philosophy he composed in 1770, the Principes philosophiques
sur la matière et le mouvement (Philosophical Principles on Matter and Motion).
There, his criticism of mathematical abstraction has a more explicitly chemical refer-
ence:
You can practice geometry and metaphysics as much as you like; but I, who
am a physicist and a chemist, who take bodies in nature and not in my mind, I
see them as existing, various, bearing properties and actions, as agitated in the
universe as they are in the laboratory where if a spark is in the proximity of three
combined molecules of saltpeter, carbon and sulfur, a necessary explosion will
ensue (Diderot 1975, XVII, p. 34).
In Diderot’s lecture notes from Guillaume-François Rouelle’s chemistry course in the
1750s at the Jardin du Roi (which he attended for three years), he also criticized the
abstractions of “physics” and insisted that “it is from chemistry that it learns or will
learn the real causes” of natural phenomena.31 Diderot’s position relies on a chemical
conception of matter as possessing active properties, over and against Newton, and
30 In addition, neither of these claims are particularly skeptical in the senses I discussed earlier. In the
first workshop in which we presented our ideas on anti-mathematicism (Warwick University 2013) Eric
Schliesser set out a very suggestive distinction between global and containment strategies in eighteenth-
century anti-mathematicism, where “global” refers to arguments that challenge and undermine the epistemic
authority and solidity ofmathematical applications as such,while “containment” refers to arguments restrict-
ing the application ofmathematical tools to specific domains (astronomy, optics). This distinction resembles
my distinction between ontological and skeptical forms of anti-mathematicism, but notice that Schliesser’s
“global” strategies are presented in epistemic terms, neatly contrasting with my ontological emphasis. His
“containment” strategies seem to fit rather well within the spectrum of more or less skeptical challenges to
mathematics that I describe, perhaps closer to the weaker form of skepticism.
31 Diderot (1975), IX, p. 209. His lecture notes were first published in 1887, and are now available in the
standard edition of his works: Cours de chimie de Mr Rouelle (1756), in Diderot (1975), IX. See discussion
in Pépin (2012).
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drawing on Rouelle’s (Stahlian) chemistry of mixts. What does this more or less anti-
Newtonian attitude mean, and what is the Rouellian chemical background?
It is too strong to label Diderot’s chemico-materialism (and its inspiration, the
vital chemistry of Rouelle and Gabriel-François Venel) as “anti-Newtonian” (Guédon
1979), or in more inflated terms to present him as “the supreme anti-Newtonian of
the High Enlightenment” (Israel 2006, p. 222).32 Rather than the more common ide-
ological opposition to Newton as the patron saint of a Boyle Lectures-type natural
theology,33 the tension here focuses on the ontology of action at a distance without
promoting against it a form of Cartesian physics.34 Diderot’s attitude towards the par-
ticular case of mathematics associated with Newton and Newtonianism is not easy to
make out clearly, but one can summarize his overall relation to the issue as follows: he
has an ontological opposition to the mathematical treatment of life, whilst he thinks
that probability theory does not do violence to the nature of organisms the way that,
say, iatromechanism did. The more empirical and the more ontological strands of anti-
mathematicism are also present in Diderot’s integration of chemistry, as I discuss now.
Rouelle’s project of tables of affinities, which is central in post-Stahlian chemistry,
including that of Venel (Pépin 2012; Restrepo 2013), was ontologically opposite to the
idea of a system of Newtonian attraction. Rouelle promoted a chemistry of affinities
(itself explicitly connected to the older idea of sympathies) over and against Newtonian
gravitation:
The ancient chemists noticed that certain bodies placed at a certain distance
attracted one another. They named the cause producing this effect …sympathy,
a term which modern chemists have replaced with affinity or relation, which
does not follow the universal law of gravity …but that of the homogeneity of
surfaces.35
32 Indeed, more recent examination suggests it is an overstatement to call Rouelle an “anti-Newtonian” as
well (Franckowiak 2003). And the opposition between a chemically ‘rich’ conception of matter and a more
‘crude’ mechanistic picture is … specific to a given program: one could also cite chemists of the period for
whom Newtonian attraction was a liberation from strict mechanism.
33 Diderot did understandNewtonianism as an ideological construct associatedwith natural theology earlier
on, most dramatically, in the figure of the blind mathematician Saunderson in his 1749 Letter on the Blind).
34 Diderot’s (not especially aggressive) criticisms of the ontology of action at a distance occur in an
“Observation” at the end of the Interprétation de la nature and later in the 1761 Réflexions sur une difficulté
proposée contre la manière dont les newtoniens expliquent la cohésion des corps (in Diderot 1975, IX; a
text printed anonymously in the Journal de Trévoux in April 1761, in which he also presents attraction as
a “general property of matter”: Diderot 1975, IX, p. 341). The most significant author at the heart of this
Diderot-Newton relation would be John Toland, since his matter theory is an influence on Diderot’s and
he was perhaps the strongest materialist critic of Newtonianism, but the comparison indicates a stronger
anti-Newtonianism in Toland. For more on Toland and Newton see Schliesser (ms.).
35 Rouelle, Cours de chimie, 1754–1758, ms., cit. in Franckowiak (2003), p. 244; see also Guédon (1979),
p. 191. Interestingly, the language of sympathies and affinities was also used in this period to describe
properties of organic interdependence which earlier mechanistic medicine had failed to account for (thus
further illustrating the relation between this ‘vital chemistry’ and medical vitalism): see e.g. Ménuret de
Chambaud (1765), p. 318b; Grimaud (1776), p. 43 (although de Sauvages 1772 is critical of the term
‘sympathies’, e.g., p. 65, he ends up using it positively later on in this work). The same language is found
in Diderot’s Éléments de physiologie (in Diderot 1975, vol. XVII, p. 499). Hoquet notes the presence of the
concept of sympathy in Buffon, now as a term explaining properties of the nervous system, in the chapter
of the Histoire naturelle dealing with … puberty (Hoquet 2005, p. 218).
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Maupertuis had also challenged Newtonian attraction as an insufficient explanation
in natural philosophy in his Système de la nature ou Essai sur les corps organisés,36
which obviously should not be taken to mean that Maupertuis was a blanket anti-
mathematicist; on the contrary, from his use of probability theory in studying cases of
polydactyly in Berlin to his expedition to Lapland, he was a major proponent of the
use of some kinds of mathematics in the life sciences, in some contexts. Here the spe-
cific challenge was how to account for processes of generation (or ‘development’ as
we would say), and even “the simplest chemical operations.”37 Maupertuis explicitly
stated that Newtonian attraction does not sufficiently account for organic phenom-
ena, and differently put, that the laws of movement are not sufficient to explain the
reproduction of living beings. In the earlier Vénus physique he had formulated the
hypothesis that natural organisms were formed by attraction alone; now, in the con-
text of an epigenetic theory, he acknowledges that the force of attraction alone cannot
sufficiently account for the production of specifically organized bodies: “A blind, uni-
form attraction distributed throughout the parts of matter would not explain how these
parts arrange themselves to form even the simplest organized body. …Why shouldn’t
they unite at random?”38 But aside from these ways of positioning projects in the
emerging life sciences within Newtonian frameworks or at a distance from them, what
specifically appealed to Diderot (who entered into a separate polemic withMaupertuis
concerning the relation between metaphysics and theory of generation) in Rouelle’s
anti-attractionist chemistry of affinities is that it supported a commitment to the unbro-
ken continuity of matter.
In his commentaries on Rouelle, Diderot connected this vision of affinities and
sympathies with his idea of a universally sensing matter. If we recall Diderot’s attitude
in the two earlier quotations (from the Pensées sur l’inteprétation de la nature and the
Principes philosophiques sur la matière et le mouvement), we can see that the combi-
nation of the first claim I distinguished (the autonomy of the biological with respect to
mechanical and mathematical explanations) and the second claim (an appeal to irre-
ducible chemical properties) are at work here too. Now, Diderot’s anti-mathematicism
is tightly bound to his overall materialist ontology of active matter (or vital matter,
since all of matter is potentially alive in his view, which tends to present sensitivity
in particular as the higher-level property which is inherent in all matter39), but even
though he draws on the vital chemistry of Rouelle et al., his arguments are not exclu-
sively of chemical provenance. Robert Schofield spoke rather mockingly of Diderot’s
36 This text first appeared in Latin in 1751 under the title Dissertatio inauguralis metaphysica de universali
naturae systemate, signed with the pseudonym Dr Baumann; it was translated by Maupertuis in 1754 as
Essai sur la formation des corps organisés and later was included in his 1756 Œuvres under the title Système
de la nature.
37 Maupertuis, Système, § III, in Maupertuis (1756/1965), p. 141.
38 Système, § XIV, in Maupertuis (1756/1965), pp. 146–147.
39 In the Rêve de D’Alembert Diderot wonders whether sensitivity is a “general property of matter” or
rather a property of organized matter alone (Diderot 1975, vol. XVII, p. 105). Fifteen years earlier, he
already described life as a “physical property of matter” in the Encyclopédie article “Animal,” influenced
by Buffon (Diderot et al. 1751, p. 474a); in the later, unfinished Éléments de physiologie (1770s), he names
sensitivity, life and motion as properties of matter, but goes on to discuss cases of organic matter (“flesh”)
in particular (Diderot 1975, vol. XVII, p. 333).
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vision of matter as “resembl[ing] at worst a neo-Platonic living macrocosm and at best
a Leibnizian pre-established harmony of self-sufficient monads” (Schofield 1978, p.
187). Leaving aside the judgmental tone, Schofield noticed something important: the
Leibnizian dimension in Diderot. Diderot definitely takes over the Leibnizian petites
perceptions in his philosophy of mind, often emphasizing the variety of subpersonal
processes at work (in perception, in instinct, in consciousness, in the will) although
his theory is also a paramount case of what has been called the ‘materialization of the
monad’, as when he described the monad as “the real atom of nature, the real element
of things.”40 As Roselyne Rey put it, “what was a principle of change in substance
has become a property of living matter” (Rey 1997, p. 122). This was exactly the
reading of Leibniz denounced by his supporters like Samuel Formey, in his (1747)
Recherches sur les éléments de la matière. Yet, to turn back to chemistry, Diderot’s
non-mechanistic, non-passive concept of matter is not just derived from Leibniz in
accordance with an internal logic of dominant figures in the history of philosophy; it
also borrows freely from more marginal sources, such as the ideas of Van Helmont,
as Diderot discusses in the article “Théosophes.”41 And these ‘chimiatric’ ideas bring
us back to the specifically chemical motivation of Diderot’s anti-mathematicism, both
inasmuch as it allows for a richer matter theory, and because of the ‘transformative’,
‘manipulative’ dimension of chemistry—which is per se more empirical, focusing on
activity.
When Diderot writes in “Théosophes” that he wishes he could return to the “sub-
lime” intuitions of a Paracelsus orVanHelmont, without giving in to their extravagance
or manic enthusiasm (Diderot 1765, p. 253b), he is emphasizing a chemical deter-
mination of matter: “The theosophists all were chymists, they called themselves
philosophers by fire. Now, there is no science which offers the mind more associa-
tive conjectures, more subtle analogies, than chymistry” (p. 254a). However, the idea
of “philosophers by fire” also refers to his enduring interest in chemistry as ‘the
great worker’, the crucial part of Nature, a conception again quite far removed from
mathematization—at least as understood in the period. In his 1750 “Prospectus” for
the Encyclopédie, Diderot wrote that “chemistry is the imitator and rival of Nature: her
object is almost as vast as that of Nature itself. She either decomposes, revitalizes or
transforms the entities [in Nature].”42 Diderot may be echoing Shaftesbury here, given
his early work translating this author: Shaftesbury had written that “‘Tis no wonder
if in this Age the Philosophy of the Alchymists prevails so much […]. We have a
strange Fancy to be Creators, a violent Desire at least to know the Knack or secret by
which Nature does all” (Shaftesbury 1711/1978, vol. II, p. 189). Lissa Roberts notices
this ‘fabricative’ and ‘manipulative’ aspect of Diderot’s engagement with chemistry
in her astute article on the ‘sensuous chemist’, stressing that for Diderot, the artisan
40 Diderot, entry “Leibnizianisme” Enc. IX, 1765, p. 374a; he also identifies monads with “entelechies”
(p. 374b), an identification which is very close to Maupertuis’s letter on monads (letter VIII), in which
monads are presented as the prime elements of matter (as they will be in Charles Bonnet and Jean-Claude
de La Métherie as well). For more on Diderot as a Leibnizian, albeit somewhat loosely argued, see Belaval
(1976).
41 See Diderot (1765) and Fabre (1961).
42 Diderot’s Prospectus of the Encyclopédie, in Diderot (1975), vol. III, p. 410.
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rather than the mathematician is the type of natural philosopher who can apprehend
and indeed comprehend the heterogeneity of Nature, here in a relation of manipu-
lation (Roberts 1995, p. 504). This in turn coheres with the specifically chemical
insistence on qualitative rather than quantitative analysis in this period and in this spe-
cific intellectual milieu: thus Roberts speaks of how Rouelle “engaged the senses in a
search for qualitative distinctions,” contrasting with Lavoisier’s later, more objectified,
quantitative types of measurement.43 Indeed, despite his ontological commitment to
a specificity of the life sciences over and against mathematics, Diderot also expressed
pragmatic or utilitarian views towards both mathematics and life science: “in a few
centuries, it will be utility (l’utile) which will serve as a constraint for experimental
physics [sc. life science, CW], as it now serves as a constraint on geometry” (Inter-
prétation, § VI, in Diderot 1975, IX, 33). This is neither a belief in the future success
of mechanism (filling in place-holders, as Haller might have had it), nor a categorical
rejection of this possibility.
The search for qualitative distinctions, indeed for a qualitatively rich matter theory
(and materialism) is, however, not just a matter of practice and manipulation. What
an analysis like Roberts’ leaves out is the twin novelty I’ve sought to call attention to
here: that these ideas belong to a projects which seek to create a conceptual matrix
for the emerging life sciences, and that this ‘vital(ist)’ suspicion towards mathematics
favors an ontology of Life, not just in Diderot but in chemists like Venel. In his
article “Chymie” in the Encyclopédie, Venel linked chemistry and life science, in
contradistinction to the ‘imperialist’ tendencies of physics (understood as an extension
of older mechanism). If Diderot was an anti-mathematical, materialist metaphysician
of Life, Venel was a professional chemist but one who understood his task (much
like biologists will in the next generations, and as Buffon intimates) as articulating an
autonomous science which can study the laws of living organization.44
Venel and Bordeu, in their respective articles in the Encyclopédie, both insisted that
the mistake of the mechanists (primarily in medicine) was to underestimate the power
of Nature, in what amounted to an attack on mathesis. Venel’s criticism of any kind
of physicalization or mathematization of physics targeted what was to become, with
Lagrange in the decades immediately following the publication of Venel’s in the 1765
‘set’ of volumes of the Encyclopédie, a formalization that made Newtonian physics
(and the chemistry it understood as a subset) a fully rational discipline, abstracting
(as Buffon and Diderot had also stressed in the 1750s) “from all particular physical
properties of bodies” and their motions (Restrepo 2013, p. 188). For Venel et al.,
one can calculate the force of attraction between two particles but not the force of
“mixture” of particles. The energy present in chemical processes was not explicable,
Venel held, in mechanistic terms, and Bordeu asserted much the same thing about the
43 Roberts (1995), p. 517. For a different perspective which presents eighteenth-century chemistry as
possessing many types of quantification, see Lundgren (1990).
44 Venel (1753), p. 410. François Pépin notes that Diderot takes over these points regarding the autonomy
of chemistry in his historical introduction to Rouelle’s chemistry lectures, which he wrote after attending
the lectures between 1754 and 1757 (Pépin 2011, p. 134).
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energy in vital processes.45 Both of their criticisms can also be understood as resisting
the reduction of secondary to primary qualities. From Diderot’s general criticisms
of mathematical abstraction in the Pensées sur l’interprétation de la nature to the
more specifically chemically oriented criticisms that he shares with chemists such as
Venel,what I called anontological commitmentwas consistently present. Indeed,when
comparing the purely abstract character ofmathematical entities to theworld of games,
Diderot playfully retorted to those mathematicians who ridiculed “metaphysics” for
its lack of reality, that they are far more metaphysical in that sense, in contrast to an
experimentally nourished, naturalistic metaphysics of living matter.46
6 Conclusion
I have tried to distinguish between an ontological hostility and a more skeptical sus-
picion towards mathematics. Both have an ‘empirical’ component, or a ‘claimed
empirical’ component: as Diderot wrote to Voltaire with a socially diagnostic tone
not unlike that of Mandeville, “The rule of mathematics is over. Tastes have changed.
The predominant [trend] now is natural history and letters.”47 The ontological form
of anti-mathematicism that I have described was particularly linked to programmatic
attempts to sketch out the contours of an emerging life science (a.k.a. ‘biology’), not
merely in operational terms but with ontological foundations. It includes and builds on
the critique of mathematical abstraction we associate with authors such as Buffon. In
contrast, the skeptical form of anti-mathematicism made no foundational pronounce-
ments on the difference between ‘geometry’ and the emerging other sciences (be it
chemistry, medicine, “natural history,” or proto-biology). As we saw in Mandeville
but also in Haller (the same is true of D’Alembert), this attitude acknowledged that
physicians could have had a legitimate suspicion in the past towards calculation and
geometry, but they believed the difficulties with quantification will be resolved, com-
pleted in the future. Recall Haller’s “Up until now, the calculators have arrived at such
opposed results that they have put offmodern physiologists from any use of geometry.”
The same is true of the other intermediate position, according to which mathematics
of a particular sort might be seen as inapplicable to medicine or ‘biology’ (or yielding
false or misleading results), while another sort of mathematics (like probabilities) was
viewed favorably (including by Buffon and Diderot).
A contemporary observer might find the identification of mathematization and
quantification puzzling, as there are plenty of mathematical analyses which do not
treat their objects quantitatively, but in the historical context I have focused on, this
near-identification seems to be predominant. Further, there seems be an ambiguity in
the narrative I have presented: even if one grants the novelty of the new life sciences
project with its ontological foundations and specific matter theory, isn’t it exagger-
ated and/or misleading to present it as hostile to quantification? Indeed, Buffon and
45 Bordeu, Recherches anatomiques sur la position des glandes et leur action (1751), in de Bordeu (1818),
I, pp. 178–180.
46 Diderot, Pensées sur l’interprétation de la nature, § III, in Diderot (1975), IX, p. 30.
47 Diderot to Voltaire, 19 February 1758, in Diderot (1997), p. 73.
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others were very empirically oriented and even (as can be seen in Diderot’s Eléments
de physiologie) experimentally oriented. Should the distinction then be between a
deductive model, appealing to the esprit géométrique and in that sense ‘natively’
mathematical, and a non-deductive model, proper to these new life sciences?48 This
matches the known territory of the history and philosophy of Enlightenment life sci-
ence, including the classic studies from the 1960s (e.g. Roger 1963/1993). But I have
been emphasizing a different aspect of the story, namely, that there is something like
a spectrum of anti-mathematical attitudes in the period, from the mildly skeptical
to the strongly (ontologically) foundational; and authors such as Haller are actually
geometry-friendly, if not in a strictly deductive fashion. In addition, I have suggested
that ontological anti-mathematicism was characteristic of a particular variant of mate-
rialism, which we might term ‘vital anti-mathematical materialism’. Both the history
of philosophical materialism and that of Enlightenment biology (or the emergence of
modern biology, depending on how Whiggish one wishes to be) might profit from
including the existence of a materialist anti-mathematicism as part and parcel of an
ontology for the emerging life sciences.
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